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Abstract
The 1917 February Revolution led to the reshaping of the war-era image of the German enemy. 
Focusing on the former imperial borderland province of the Southwestern Krai, this article 
unveils the national, political, and cultural considerations of the local Ukrainian and Russian-
language media that affected their attitude towards the Germans. It argues that the developments 
of the 1917–1918 Ukrainian Revolution presented a unique case of constructing the image of the 
Germans due to the ongoing rivalry between the respective Ukrainian and Russian national 
projects. The study is based on the materials of prominent Kyivan daily newspapers, thus 
rendering the spectrum of the region’s political thought. Built upon the concept of imagology, 
the article apprehends the images of “otherness” in conjunction with the actor’s own identity.
Key Words: image of the Germans, Kyivan press, Ukrainian Revolution, nationalism, First 
World War.
3
Introduction
Throughout the First World War, the image of the ultimate German threat had served as a key 
instrument of the Russian Empire’s mass mobilization and war effort. However, by the time the 
1917 February Revolution broke out, this propaganda construct had already been overshadowed 
by general war weariness.1 The downfall of the Romanov dynasty brought to an end the country’s 
rigid “war till victory” policy and thus shattered the uniform image of the enemy. Instead, various 
political actors acceding to power across the former empire had adopted their distinct attitudes 
towards belligerent Germany.2 In particular, this occurred in the Southwestern Krai where the 
1  Elena Seniavskaia, “Obraz vraga v soznanii uchastnikov pervoi mirovoi voiny [The Image of the 
Enemy in the Perception of First World War Participants],” in Protivniki Rossii v voinakh XX veka: 
Evoliutsiia “obraza vraga” v soznanii armii i obshchestva, ed. Elena Seniavskaia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 
2006), 62–72.
2  Boris Kolonizkij, “Metamorphosen der Germanophobie: Deutschland in den politischen Konflikten 
der Februarrevolution von 1917,” in Verführungen der Gewalt. Russen und Deutsche im Ersten und 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2005), 125–27.
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Ukrainian movement had succeeded in the establishment of a de facto independent national 
state by November 20, 1917.3
The administrative, economic, and cultural center of the Southwestern Krai was the city of 
Kyiv. In 1917 Kyiv became the locus of the region’s revolutionary activity, contested between the 
Ukrainian and the Russian national projects. As contrasted to the numerically superior Ukrainian 
population of the Krai, the Russians constituted the majority of Kyiv’s dwellers.4 Traditionally, 
they considered the Ukrainians to be “Little Russians” —  an inherent part of the single all-Russian 
nation.5 By covering both the Ukrainian and the Russian-language press this study illustrates how 
different national identities influenced the controversial perception of the Germans during the 
time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and the Hetmanate. While modern historiography 
on the subject is limited to the comprehensive, yet Russia-centered investigations of Boris 
Kolonizkij and Tatiana Filippova, this research provides a distinct Ukrainian perspective.6 
Alongside with other national movements on the periphery of the disintegrating Empire, the 
Ukrainian Revolution presents a unique background for constructing the image of the Germans.7
The study is based on the materials of Kyiv’s prominent daily newspapers that formed the 
entire spectrum of the city’s political thought: the Ukrainian social liberal Nova Rada and the 
press organ of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party —  Robitnycha Hazeta, the Russian 
rightist Kievlianin and Golos Kieva, progressive (socialist and liberal) Kievskaia Mysl, Poslednie 
3 The paper employs the Gregorian calendar. However, the text preserves the original Julian calendar 
in the footnotes to those articles that were published prior to the calendar reform of March 1918. On 
the history of the Ukrainian Revolution, see: Valerii Smolii et al., Narysy istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 
1917–1921 rokiv [Essays on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1921)], vol.1 (Kyiv: Naukova 
dumka, 2011).
4 In 1917 the Ukrainians amounted to 75.5% of the Southwestern Krai’s population while the 
Russians —  only to 3.4%. According to the statistics of Isaac Bisk, in 1917 Kyiv reached the level of 
approximately 470,000 dwellers. Among them, the largest share of 49.9% belonged to the ethnic 
Russians while the Ukrainians held only 12%, another 4.4% identified themselves as Little Russians 
(Malorossy in Russian); other nationalities held around 34% of the city’s population. Russians 
retained key positions in the economy, culture, and administration while Ukrainians occupied the 
lowest social ranks. See: Tamara Lazanska, “Narodonaselennia Ukrainy [The Population of Ukraine],” 
in “Ukrainske pytannia” v Rosiiskii imperii (kinets XIX —  pochatok XX st.), ed. V. H. Sarbei (Kyiv: 
Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1999), 78–111.
5 Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism. Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research 
(Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2008), 161–81.
6 Kolonizkij, “Metamorphosen der Germanophobie,” 121–44; Tatjana Filippowa, “Von der Witzfigur 
zum Unmenschen. Die Deutschen in den Kriegsausgaben von ‘Nowyj Satirikon’ und ‘Krokodil,’” in 
Verführungen der Gewalt. Russen und Deutsche im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher 
and Astrid Volpert (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2005), 267–97.
7 On war nationalism and the decolonization process see: Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: 
The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Eric 
Lohr, “War Nationalism,” in The Empire and Nationalism at War, ed. Eric Lohr et al. (Bloomington: 
Slavica, 2014), 91–108.
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Novosti, and Yuzhnaia Gazeta.8 Since these newspapers had been politically committed to the 
July 1917 Kyiv City Council elections, it is possible to deduce their potential audience from the 
result of that ballot.9 Out of the 307,000 individuals eligible in the general secret ballot, 174,000 
participated in the elections.10 The Socialist Bloc (formed by the Russian leftists and supported by 
Kievskaia Mysl) gained 37% and the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (Poslednie Novosti, 
Yuzhnaia Gazeta) additionally received 9%, the Ukrainian socialist parties gained 21%, the Non-
Partisan Alliance of Russian voters (supported by Kievlianin) gained 15% and the Bolsheviks —  
6% of the approval rate.11 As follows from the above data, the city itself remained a stronghold 
of Russian influence. As to the Ukrainian press, according to Oleksandr Mukomela its popularity 
rested upon the Ukrainian majority of the Krai.12
The study proceeds from Benedict Anderson’s concept of a nation as an “imagined political 
community” and is built on the notion of imagology.13 Anderson emphasizes the principal role 
of a printed vernacular in the creation of a broad imagined community of native speakers. In 
particular, he credits the press for the dissemination of national ideas in 19th century Europe.14 
Similarly to the Anderson’s concept, imagology apprehends a written text as an instrument 
of national image construction. Dealing with the textual analysis of national representations, 
imagology addresses cross-national relations and seeks to uncover the image of the “other” in 
8 On the history of the Kyivan press see: Anastasiia Volobuieva and Nataliia Sydorenko, Formuvannia 
presy Kyieva (1835–1918): monohrafiia v 4 t. [The Formation of the Kyivan Press, 1835–1918: A Monograph 
in 4 Volumes] (Kyiv: Tempora, 2011); Yuliia Polovynchak, Hazeta “Kievlianin” i ukrainstvo: dosvid 
natsionalnoi samoidentyfikatsii [The Kievlianin Newspaper and the Ukrainians: An Experience of 
National Self-Identification] (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 2008).
9 “Za kogo golosovat [Who to Vote for]?,” Kievskaia Mysl, July 22, 1917, 1; “Vnimaniiu grazhdan g. Kieva 
[To the Attention of the Citizens of Kyiv],” Poslednie Novosti, July 13, 1917, 1; “Golosuite za spisok № 4 
partii Narodnoi svobody [Vote for List No.4 of the Peoples’ Freedom Party],” Yuzhnaia Gazeta, July 21, 
1917, 2; V. Shulgin, “Kiev, 25 iiulia 1917 g. [Kyiv, July 25, 1917],” Kievlianin, July 26, 1917, 1–2.
10 “Obshchie itogi [General Results],” Kievskaia Mysl, July 25, 1917, 2.
11 “Obshchie itogi,” 2.
12 Oleksandr Mukomela, Na zlami vikiv: ukrainska zhurnalistyka na pochatku XX st. Navchalnyi posibnyk 
[At the Turn of Centuries: Ukrainian Journalism at the Beginning of the 20th Century. A Tutorial] (Kyiv: 
Hramota, 2010), 48–64.
13 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
rev. ed. (London: Verso Books, 1991), 5–7. On the history and method of imagology please see: 
Manfred Beller, “Perception, Image, Imagology,” in Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary 
Representation of National Characters: A Critical Survey, ed. Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen 
(Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2007), 3–16; Joep Leerssen, “Imagology: History and Method,” 
in Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters: A Critical 
Survey, ed. Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2007), 17–30; Marco 
Cinnirella, “Ethnic and National Stereotypes: A Social Identity Perspective,” in Beyond Pug’s Tour: 
National and Ethnic Stereotyping in Theory and Literary Practice, ed. C. C. Barfoot (Amsterdam; 
Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), 39–42.
14 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83–88.
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conjunction with the actor’s “self-image.” This survey explores a set of opinions about Germany 
and the Germans, found in leading articles of the Kyivan press.15
The Perception of Germany in Times of the UNR and the Hetmanate
The 1917 October Uprising in Petrograd marked the end of the Russian Provisional Government’s 
“revolutionary defense” policy, thus paving the way for the Bolsheviks’ concept of an immediate 
truce with the Central Powers.16 Yet, neither the majority of the Russian political parties nor the 
Ukrainian Central Rada had recognized the legitimacy of the new Bolshevik order.17 Therefore, 
acting as a legal regional authority, the Central Rada had established a separate Ukrainian 
People’s Republic (UNR). These developments led to the final destruction of the former all-
Russian informational space and introduced the Ukrainian-language press of Kyiv as a new 
mouthpiece of the state. Denouncing the Bolsheviks, both Nova Rada and Robitnycha Hazeta 
were anxious about their intention to conclude a peace treaty on behalf of entire Russia.18 In 
order to counteract this, Robitnycha Hazeta urged to adopt:
A definite, clear, independent tactic in the peace negotiations… in order to 
save Ukraine from the harsh consequences of the Council of the People’s 
Commissars’ activity, from the harsh intentions of Germany to conquer 
Ukraine together with the no less odious plans of the Allies.19
15 A leading article is a newspaper article providing editorial opinion. See: Oxford Dictionaries, s. v. 
“leading article,” accessed April 3, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/leading_article.
16 Since the 1917 abolition of the monarchy the idea of “revolutionary defense” was adopted as an 
ideological substitute for outdated imperial war doctrine. While pursuing the same “war till victory” 
objective, the Russian Provisional Government officially propagated the defense of revolutionary 
Russian democracy against the despotic regime of imperialistic Germany. See: Kolonizkij, 
“Metamorphosen der Germanophobie,” 121–27.
17 In March 1917 the Ukrainian Central Rada was organized in Kyiv as the all-Ukrainian center, uniting 
political, cultural, and professional organizations. Following the decision of the All-Ukrainian 
National Congress, on April 21, 1917 the Central Rada became the revolutionary parliament of 
Ukraine. On July 16, 1917 the Russian Provisional Government recognized the Central Rada as 
Ukraine’s highest regional authority. See: Vladyslav Verstiuk, “Liutneva revoliutsiia, Ukrainska 
Tsentralna Rada, Brest [The February Revolution, the Ukrainian Central Rada, Brest],” in Narysy 
istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 1917–1921 rokiv, ed. by Valerii Smolii et al., vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 
2011), 87–250.
18 “Separatnyi myr [The Separate Peace],” Nova Rada, November 18, 1917, 1; “Bolshevytska dyplomatiia 
[Bolshevik Diplomacy],” Nova Rada, December 13, 1917, 1.
19 “Ukrainska Narodna Respublika i nehainyi demokratychnyi myr [The Ukrainian People’s Republic 
and the Immediate Democratic Peace],” Robitnycha Hazeta, December 9, 1917, 1.
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As “Germany itself had been exhausted to the end,” Nova Rada anticipated its reciprocity.20 
The outbreak of Soviet Russia’s aggression against the UNR in December of 1917 had only 
strengthened the anti-Bolshevik sentiments of the Ukrainian press. Nova Rada condemned the 
Bolsheviks’ military invasion as an act of hypocrisy, rhetorically asking the Russian “brothers 
and comrades”: “Do you perceive us, the democracy of Ukraine, as a more terrifying enemy than 
the hordes of General Hindenburg [German Field Marshal] themselves?!” 21 Indignant about the 
Russian Bolsheviks’ war crimes in Ukraine, Nova Rada drew a parallel between these and the past 
atrocities of the German and Tsarist armies.22
The Russian-language press of Kyiv shared the Ukrainian media’s strong dislike for the 
Bolshevik regime. Yet, the Russian newspapers generally neglected the Ukrainian UNR-centered 
stance and perceived the October Uprising from the all-Russian perspective. They claimed that 
the final defeat of Russia was the result of a German-Bolshevik conspiracy.23 Routinely depicting 
the underhanded German plotting, newspapers presented the Bolsheviks as the principal traitors, 
“puppets in the hands of the Germans.” 24 Lev Voitolovskii was one of many commentators:
Here, in Russia, they are tearing off the epaullets from the officers, with 
whom they were once shedding blood for the integrity of the Russian 
borders; yet, in the occupied territories… where the sibilant whip is firmly 
squeezed in the hand of the German officer, they are silent and humble, 
bending their backs in front of the Prussian masters.25
Meanwhile, Kievlianin acknowledged Germany’s victory over the Slavs as the product of 
the enemy’s higher level of patriotic consciousness and the nation’s unity.26 Kievlianin’s Editor-
in-chief Vasilii Shulgin blamed apathetic Russian society and its “irresponsible” revolutionary 
leaders: “The self-sacrificing German patriots will be the rulers over the Russians, who had 
20 “Ahoniia [Agony],” Nova Rada, January 16, 1918, 1.
21 “Vidozva vseukrainskoho zizdu rad deputativ [The Proclamation of the All-Ukrainian Congress of 
Board Deputies],” Nova Rada, December 9, 1917, 1.
22 “Zvidky zvirstva [Where do Atrocities Arise From]?,” Nova Rada, December 21, 1917, 1.
23 “Edinyi bolshevistsko-imperialisticheskii front [The Sole Bolshevik-Imperialist Front],” Kievskaia 
Mysl, December 8, 1917, 1; Vl. Rozanov, “Torzhestvo germanskogo imperializma [The Triumph 
of German Imperialism],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 10, 1917, 1; D. “Nemtsy o russkoi revoliutsii 
[Germans About the Russian Revolution],” Kievlianin, January 4, 1918, 2.
24 “Dekret o mire [The Decree on Peace],” Poslednie Novosti, November 10, 1917, 1; “Germanskii 
prikaz o bratanii [The German Order About Fraternization],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 17, 1917, 3; 
A. N. Aleksandrovskii, “Nemets i slavianin [The German and the Slav],” Yuzhnaia Gazeta, November 5, 
1917, 2; “Peremirie zakliucheno —  obiavlena novaia voina [Truce is Concluded —  New War is 
Proclaimed],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 5, 1917, 1.
25 L. Voitolovskii, “Russkie kommunary pered litsom prusskikh generalov [The Russian Communards in 
Face of the Prussian Generals],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 15, 1917, 2.
26 Petrogradets, “Petrogradskie otkliki. Oboshli molchaniem [The Petrograd Responses. Passed Over in 
Silence],” Kievlianin, October 15, 1917, 2.
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disavowed their Motherland.” 27 The newspaper portrayed average Russian citizens, who were 
completely indifferent about the threat of “German enslavement,” contemptuously. These 
citizens typically responded that they “used to live under Nicholas [of Russia],” and so, “would 
live under [German Emperor] Wilhelm as well.” 28
The allegedly German instigated Ukrainian question was another concern of the Russian-
language press. Kievskaia Mysl dreaded enemy annexation of Russia’s “Western Provinces” under 
the pretext of their national liberation.29 As Vasilii Rozanov argued, German imperialism aimed 
“to extrude Russia into Asia … to deprive her of European culture and political weight in the 
region.” 30 Commenting on the separate peace negotiations, Konstantin Sukhovykh (Narodin) 
encouraged the Ukrainian Government to abstain from collaboration with the Germans.31 In 
turn, Shulgin forewarned the Ukrainians about the cunning German policy of divide et impera:
The Germans are fully aware that despite all their diabolic fraud over the 
foundation of “Independent” Ukraine, the close link between the latter and 
Russia, i. e. between the South-Russian and North-Russian states could be 
revived.32
For Shulgin the “fratricidal” Soviet–Ukrainian war was actually German intrigue, directed at 
Russia’s dissolution.33 Kievlianin resisted the Ukrainian pro-German orientation by condemning 
the reccurence of “Mazepa’s treason,” intimidating Ukrainians with disastrous economic 
aftermaths and inevitable Allied retaliation.34 Shulgin proclaimed:
27 Vasilii Shulgin (1878–1976) was a Russian statesman, politician, and publicist, a member of the 
II, III, and IV Imperial Dumas. From 1913 Shulgin held the position of Kievlianin’s Editor-in-chief. 
An adherent of the idea of Russian great-power nationalism, Shulgin strongly opposed Ukrainian 
national self-determination. See: Anatolii Shikman, Deiateli otechestvennoi istorii. Biograficheskii 
spravochnik [The Figures of National History. A Biographical Dictionary], vol. 2, s. v. “Shulgin Vasilii 
Vitalievich,” (Moscow: ACT, 1997). V. Shulgin, “Respublika s tsarem [The Republic with the Tsar],” 
Kievlianin, November 19, 1917, 1.
28 A. Lokhov, “Dym otechestva [The Smoke of the Homeland],” Kievlianin, October 31, 1917, 1.
29 “Gore pobezhdennym [Devil Take the Hindmost]!,” Kievskaia Mysl, December 22, 1917, 1.
30 Rozanov, “Torzhestvo germanskogo imperializma,” 1.
31 K. Narodin, “Tsentralnaia rada i mir [The Central Rada and Peace],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 17, 
1917, 1.
32 V. Shulgin, “Oselok II [The Touchstone II],” Kievlianin, December 1, 1917, 1.
33 Shulgin, “Respublika s tsarem,” 1; V. Shulgin, “Tak bylo, no tak da ne budet [It Has Been so but Will 
Never be Again],” Kievlianin, December 8, 1917, 1–2.
34 “Mazepa’s treason” derives from the name of Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709), who had 
opposed his Russian patron, tsar Peter the Great, and took the Swedish side in the Great Northern 
War, 1700–1721. The Russian nationalists commonly utilized the “mazepynstvo” defamatory cliché 
to mark the Ukrainian national movement as treacherous towards Russia. See: V. B. Liubchenko, 
Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], vol. 6, s. v. “Mazepynstvo,” 
(Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2009), 426–27. Source: Shulgin, “Tak bylo, no tak da ne budet,” 1–2; “Rech, 
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One cannot expect good from the Ukrainians, with marks stuck to their 
hands…  In the event of a German victory they together with the rest of 
the Slavs will languish miserably as slaves, but unlike the rest —  with the 
brand of Cain on the brow.35
For the sake of salvation he urged Ukraine to become “the second righteous among nations” 
along with “Lot” —  the Russian White movement’s leader General Kaledin.36 However, on the eve 
of the Ukrainian —  Central Powers’ peace agreement Kievlianin acknowledged its failure. Shulgin 
depicted Ukrainians as “beloved German apprentices,” who were eager to find themselves under 
the patronage of “the Berlin Eagle.” 37 Despite this intermediate defeat, Kievlianin was confident in 
the final triumph of the anti-German coalition and the subsequent restoration of allied Russia.38
When on February 9, 1918 Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers at 
Brest-Litovsk, it was recognized as an independent nation and received military assistance in the 
war against the Bolsheviks. By concluding the treaty Germany sought to resolve its pressing food 
shortages at the expense of the Ukrainian surplus and, what is important, to undermine Russian 
hegemony in the region.39 Although the German interference had far-reaching consequences, in 
the spring of 1918 the allied Deutsches Heer played a crucial role in the repulsion of the Russian 
Bolsheviks and the renewal of the Ukrainian state.40 This foreign military support had drastically 
reshaped the attitude of the Kyivan press towards the Germans, marking a new era of mutual 
cooperation. The friendly image was reinforced by the German communiqués, typically pledging 
to assist Ukraine: “Our troops were summoned to help Ukraine in her up-hill struggle against 
the Great Russians…” 41 Ukrainian officials induced the population “to meet the German army 
easily and trustingly, to join it in the defense of one’s own country against the Katsap furious 
skazannaia V. V. Shulginym 20-go dekabria v sobranii russkikh izbiratelei [The Speech of V. V. Shulgin, 
Proclaimed on December 20 at the Meeting of Russian Voters],” Kievlianin, December 22, 1917, 1; 
V. Shulgin, “Lebedinaia pesn [The Swan Song],” Kievlianin, December 17, 1917, 1.
35 “Rech, skazannaia V. V. Shulginym,” 1.
36 “Rech, skazannaia V. V. Shulginym,” 1.
37 V. Shulgin, “Universal № 4. Vіiut vitry, vіiut buini [The 4th Universal. The Winds are Blowing, 
the Stormy Winds],” Kievlianin, January 14, 1918, 1.
38 Shulgin, “Universal № 4,” 1; A. Ezhov, “Vpechatleniia. Dzhentlmen [The Impressions. The 
Gentleman],” Kievlianin, September 27, 1917, 1; A. Lohov, “Bez anneksii i kontributsii [Without 
Annexations and Contributions],” Kievlianin, December 16, 1917, 1.
39 Oleh Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1971), 60–86.
40 Borislav Chernev, “Ukrainization and its Contradictions in the Context of the Brest-Litovsk 
System,” in The Empire and Nationalism at War, eds. Eric Lohr, Vera Tolz, and Alexander Semyonov 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica Publishers, 2014), 163–87.
41 “Hermanske povidomlennia vid 19-ho liutoho [The German Communiqué of February 19],” Nova 
Rada, February 24, 1918, 3; “Hermanskyi kantsler ukrainskomu pravytelstvu [The German Chancellor’s 
Statement, Directed to the Ukrainian Government],” Nova Rada, March 13, 1918, 2.
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and corrupt gangs!” 42 Since the recapture of Kyiv in March 1918 the Germans were praised as 
“allies” and “liberators,” “clearing Ukraine” from the Russian-Bolshevik invaders.43 This pro-
German orientation consolidated even further upon the information of the Entente’s support 
for an indivisible Russia.44
In spite of the above mentioned positive changes, the image of the Germans remained 
ambiguous across the region and amongst different groups. Newspapers reported on the pro-
Russian and pro-Bolshevik resistance in the South East of Ukraine.45 Nova Rada apprehended 
this as inertia of thinking —  a result of deeply rooted imperial Germanophobia:
Citizens should finally subdue their war-built views and discern the German 
army the way it actually is —  as a helper in the fight against the common 
enemy —  the enemy, whom we could not overcome on our own.46
The Ukrainian countryside was initially anxious about “reactionery” German rule and 
the food requisitions.47 At the same time peasants were pleasantly astonished with the fact 
of “German-Ukrainian” cooperation.48 Well-to-do farmers soon credited the Germans with the 
42 Katsap —  a common Ukrainian pejorative term for the Great Russians (Russians). Plausibly, the 
term was coined from the “Kak Tsap” word combination, meaning “Like a Goat” and referring to the 
mocking Ukrainian stereotype of an average bearded Russian. However, member of the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Dmytro Yavornytskyi demonstrated the Turkic origin of the term. 
In fact, “Katsap” derived from the Turkic notion of “Kasap” i. e. “Butcher,” “Knacker.” See: Yevhen 
Nakonechnyi, Ukradene imia: Chomu rusyny staly ukraintsiamy [The Stolen Name: Why the Ruthenians 
Became the Ukrainians], (Lviv: Piramida, 2004), 327–37. Source: “Proklamatsiia myrnoi ukrainskoi 
delehatsii [The Proclamation of the Ukrainian Peace Delegation],” Nova Rada, February 28, 1918, 1; 
“Rozmova z ministrom dorih [Interview with the Minister of Transport],” Nova Rada, March 10, 
1918, 2.
43 “Rozhrom bilshovykiv pid Birzuloiu [The Defeat of the Bolsheviks near Birzula],” Nova Rada, 
March 9, 1918, 3; “Vyzvolennia Kharkova [The Liberation of Kharkiv],” Nova Rada, April 12, 1918, 2; 
“Za dvoma zaitsiamy [Two Birds in the Bush],” Nova Rada, April 5, 1918, 2.
44 “Frantsuzka presa pro myr z Ukrainoiu [The French Press About the Peace with Ukraine],” Nova 
Rada, March 14, 1918, 1; “Soiuznyky Rosii [Russia’s Allies],” Nova Rada, April 10, 1918, 1; “Soiuznyky Rosii 
ta Ukrainy [The Allies of Russia and Ukraine],” Nova Rada, April 12, 1918, 1.
45 “V Nikolaeve [In Mykolaiv],” Kievskaia Mysl, March 26, 1918, 3; “Voina s bolshevikami [The War 
against the Bolsheviks],” Kievskaia Mysl, April 16, 1918, 2.
46 “Delikatna sprava [A Delicate Matter],” Nova Rada, April 9, 1918, 1.
47 “Mala Rada. Zasidannia 9-ho bereznia [The Small Rada, 9th of March Session],” Nova Rada, 
March 10, 1918, 1; “Hermantsi v s. Bilychakh i Zhulianakh [The Germans in the Vilage of Bilychy 
and in Zhuliany],” Nova Rada, March 8, 1918, 4; “Dopysy z m. Dziunkiv, Berdychivskoho povitu 
na Kyivshchyni [News Stories from the City of Dziunkiv, Berdychivskii District, Kyiv Province],” 
Robitnycha Hazeta, April 24, 1918, 4; “Dopysy. S. Kamianeche Umanskoho povitu [News Stories from 
the Village of Kamianeche, Umanskyi District],” Nova Rada, April 5, 1918, 4.
48 “Osvidomlennia [The Notification],” Nova Rada, March 24, 1918, 2.
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establishment of a safe, “strict but just” order. Yet, the poor and anarchists remained ill-disposed 
and favored the Bolshevik style plunder of the “bourgeoisie.” 49 Notably, Nova Rada supported 
the German police operations against such criminal gangs.50 The leader of the Ukrainian Party 
of Socialists-Federalists and the former vice-president of the Central Rada, Serhii Yefremov, 
apprehended the German stay as a forced upon yet potentially beneficial model. He hoped that 
the Ukrainians would eventually adopt the German virtues of order and diligence.51 According to 
Yefremov, by the summer of 1918 the Germans had managed to win the hearts of the Ukrainian 
peasantry:
A German POW had appeared here for the first time in the spring of 1916 … 
Mostly he behaved with dignity and left behind not only good fame but also 
a great deal of romances. [Then came] the real German —  carrying a rifle 
and an iron helmet, serious, self-possessed, disciplined… At first there were 
incidents when in response to the German provision requests, concerning 
let us say, “eggs,” the peasants replied: “No Central Rada —  no eggs.” Now this 
is in the past… The Germans are purchasing and paying on a regular basis… 
They are supplied willingly, without requisitions. … One can see power in 
a German. Initially it seemed to be hostile; “defending the bourgeois, they 
say,” yet it is increasingly appealing due to its inner correctness, self-control, 
discipline: this is just a well set operating mechanism… The Germans are 
stationed in the village for over a month —  and not a single hen is missing, 
none of the window glass is broken, neither a drunken individual among 
them, nor bloody noses amongst the locals. Our lads are amazed… 52
Not all of the Ukrainian Central Rada’s statesmen shared Yefremov’s favorable attitude 
towards the Germans. As early as the end of March 1917 the Ukrainian Social Democrats 
acknowledged the threat of imperial Germany. Their party newspaper, Robitnycha Hazeta, was 
dissatisfied with plausible German economic domination and the infringement of the leftist 
movement in Ukraine.53 Member of the Central Rada and former minister of education, Ivan 
Steshenko, rhymed this concern:
49 Prokhozhyi, “Lyst z Bilotserkivshchyny [A Letter from the Bila Tserkva Province],” Nova Rada, 
March 28, 1918, 4; “Dopysy. Nizhyn (na Chernihivshchyni) [News Stories. Nizhyn (Chernihiv 
Province)],” Nova Rada, April 3, 1918, 4.
50 “St. Rakitna [Rakitna Station],” Nova Rada, March 14, 1918, 4.
51 Serhii Yefremov, “Na ruiinakh. IV [On the Ruins. IV],” Nova Rada, July 19, 1918, 2.
52 Yefremov, “Na ruiinakh,” 2.
53 “Pro spravu tovaroobminu z tsentralnymy derzhavamy [About the Deal of Trade Barter with the 
Central Powers],” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 4, 1918, 2; L. Bukhanovskyi, “Ekonomichni narysy [Feature 
Stories on Economics],” Robitnycha Hazeta, March 29, 1918, 2; “Z Partiinoho zhyttia. Zbory kyivskoi 
orhanizatsii USDR partii [From Party Life. The Assembly of Kyiv’s Organization of the Ukrainian SD 
Workers’ Party],” Robitnycha Hazeta, March 27, 1918, 1–2.
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Do you believe, friends of order,
That cannons of Krupp and the bayonets fodder
Will build you a levee against all odds
Rising over live human thoughts? 54
It should be noted though, that Robitnycha Hazeta’s aversion towards “German imperialism” 
was actually limited to the “Prussian” ruling elite. On the contrary, the newspaper preserved a 
traditional sympathy for nation-wide “German democracy.” 55 Overall, the newspapers perceived 
the Ukrainian Government’s ineffectiveness as the primary cause of the German interference in 
the country’s internal affairs. The media feared that the non-implementation of the peace treaty 
provisions concerning the food supply would lead to German military occupation.56 In the words 
of Nova Rada, the German army “would neither help nor befriend us on an empty stomach…” 57
The Russian-language press of Kyiv perceived the Germans from the standpoint of their 
primary goal —  the restoration of a “one and indivisible Russia.” For Kievlianin the February 1918 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Ukraine —  Central Powers) symbolized the start of the foreign German 
occupation. Yet, Shulgin welcomed the Germans with a grim irony, as a just retribution for the 
outrages of the revolutionaries:
It came strong, steady, confident… Counter-revolution came personified 
by the German officers and soldiers, who occupied Russia. … Counter-
revolution is order, stable authority; it is the end to idleness, chatter, the 
end of the bullying and violence against the defenseless… The Germans 
54 “Vy vvazhaiete, druzi poriadku, / Shcho harmatamy Kruppa i shtykamy / sporudyty zdolaiete hatku 
/ Nad zhyvymy liudskymy dumkamy?” —  Iv. Steshenko, “Druzi poriadku [The Friends of Order],” 
Robitnycha Hazeta, April 23, 1918, 2.
55 Both the socialists and the liberals in the pre-1914 Russian Empire commonly sympathized with 
the German democratic movement. They drew a parallel between the autocratic regimes in Berlin 
and St. Petersburg, apprehending the parliamentary success of the German Social Democratic 
Party as a forerunner of the future democratic reforms in Russia. See: Nikolaj Plotnikov and Modest 
Kolerov, “Deutschland aus sozialliberaler Sicht,” in Deutsche und Deutschland aus russischer Sicht 
19./20. Jahrhundert: von den Reformen Alexanders II bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Dagmar Herrmann 
(München: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), 201. Source: P. Livoberezhnyi, “Nimetski sots.-dem. v suchasnii viini 
[The German Social Democrats’ Participation in the Present War],” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 4, 1918, 
2; “Ziizd nimetskykh imperialistiv [The Assembly of German Imperialists],” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 
26, 1918, 2.
56 On March 18, 1918 the German command of the Army Group Kyiv bypassed the Ukrainian authority 
and announced a compulsory sowing campaign. See: Ruslan Pyrih, “Nimetsko-avstriiska okupatsiia 
Ukrainy 1918 r.: do pytannia pro terminolohichnu vyznachenist [The German-Austrian Occupation of 
Ukraine in 1918: Clarifying Terminology],” Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal 3 (2013): 17–18. Source: “Khto 
vynen [Who is Guilty]?,” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 20, 1918, 1; “Pered podiiamy [Before the Events],” 
Nova Rada, April 20, 1918, 2.
57 “Nebezpechna neiasnist [Dangerous Uncertainity],” Nova Rada, March 15, 1918, 1.
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brought this order at the point of their bayonets… in the first place restoring 
railroads, they ordered to sweep and perfectly clean our miserable Kyiv 
train station —  the emblem of contemporary culture… Cleanness and 
tidiness! Is there a source ever more hostile to the crowned with dirt Russian 
Revolution? 58
However, the loyal to the Entente Kievlianin refused to collaborate with the “honest German 
enemy” and announced its closure.59 In April of 1918 its editorial staff organized another rightist 
newspaper, Golos Kieva. The Russian newspapers acknowledged the German army’s support 
for the Ukrainian state.60 Still, they expressed gratitude to the Germans for their “courteous” 
treatment, and liberation from the Bolshevik terror.61 Aware of Germany’s mercenary goals, the 
Russian press predicted the near end of the Ukrainian state project.62
The subsequent changes in attitude towards the Germans occurred in late April of 1918, 
following the forcible dissolution of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Instigated by the German 
military command, the Hetman’s coup d’état had led to the de facto German military occupation 
of Ukraine.63 Consequently, this disrupted Ukraine’s “German orientation.” 64 Ex-member of the 
Central Rada and Nova Rada’s Editor-in-chief Andrii Nikovskyi wrote:
When the German army came to Ukraine to help in the war against the 
Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian intellectuals and the conscious part of the people 
at first vaguely and then with a growing interest embraced the “German 
orientation” —  the idea of the relations with Germany that could lead to 
58 V. Shulgin, “Kiev, 24 fevralia (9-go marta) 1918 g. [Kyiv, February 24 (March 9), 1918],” Kievlianin, 
February 25, 1918, 1.
59 Shulgin, “Kiev, 24 fevralia,” 1.
60 D. Zaluzhnyi, “V ekstaze samostiinosti [In the Ecstasy of Independence],” Golos Kieva, April 21, 1918, 2.
61 “Nemtsy na vokzale [The Germans at the Railway Station],” Poslednie Novosti, March 3, 1918, 2; 
“Prikaz germanskim voiskam na Ukraine gen. Grenera [The Order of General Groener to the German 
Troops],” Poslednie Novosti, March 31, 1918, 1; “Saksontsy v Kieve [Saxons in Kyiv],” Poslednie Novosti, 
April 5, 1918, 2; “Voina s bolshevikami [The War against the Bolsheviks],” Kievskaia Mysl, March 14, 
1918, 3; “Osvobozhdenie ot bolshevikov Chernigovskoi gubernii [The Liberation of Chernigiv Province 
from the Bolsheviks],” Kievskaia Mysl, March 13, 1918, 3.
62 “V germanskom shtabe [In the German Headquarters],” Poslednie Novosti, April 26, 1918, 2; “Prikaz 
gen. Feldmarshala fon-Eikhgorna [The Order of General Field Marshal von Eichhorn],” Kievskaia 
Mysl, April 27, 1918, 1.
63 Since the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada Germany has lost its official status of an allied 
power. Although it continued with the policy of formal Ukrainian State recognition, the German 
military administration de facto subdued the Hetman’s authority and established the occupational 
regime. See: Pyrih, “Nimetsko-avstriiska okupatsiia Ukrainy,” 13–30.
64 Samovydets, “Malyi feileton. Novyny nashoi literatury ‘Choho pryishly nimtsi na Ukrainu’ [A Small 
Satyrical Article. News of our Literature ‘Why Did the Germans Come to Ukraine’],” Robitnycha 
Hazeta, May 11, 1918, 2; A. Yarynovych, “Klopit [Trouble],” Nova Rada, May 29, 1918, 2.
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amity with this state. [… however] In the present circumstances in Ukraine 
the German orientation is almost entirely gone… 65
The Ukrainian newspapers accused the “reactionary German elite” of the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty’s violation and the usurpation of power under the mask of the Hetmanate.66 However, 
former Central Rada politicians refrained from military resistance and adopted the strategy 
of public protest.67 In the first place, the Ukrainian press acknowledged the government’s 
incompetence and the overall nation’s infantilism as the primary causes of the state’s failure. Yet, 
there were other reasons to tolerate the German occupation. First, the German army remained 
the only force capable of defending Ukraine from permanent Russian Bolshevik invasion.68 
Second, the alternative to the German defeat had been reckoned as an even greater disaster due 
to the pro-Russian stance of the Entente Powers.69 As a result, the Ukrainian media supported the 
pro-Ukrainian German political opposition in the Reichstag.70 Notably, it was the German Social 
Democrats and the party of the Center —  who favored the creation of a strong Ukrainian state 
as a “forefront of Western civilization” against the Russian peril.71 Simultaneously, the Ukrainian 
press attempted to discourage the German Government from its support of the former imperial 
Russian elites in Ukraine.72 It forewarned Berlin that the Hetmanate authority consisted of 
pro-Russian elements, secretly hostile towards both the German Empire and Ukraine.73 On the 
65  A. Nikovskyi, “Pered zminoiu oriientatsii [On the Brink of the Orientation Change],” Nova Rada, 
May 24, 1918, 1.
66 “Do nashoho mizhnarodnoho stanovyshcha [Concerning our International Position],” Robitnycha 
Hazeta, May 3, 1918, 1; “Derzhavnyi perevorot u Kyievi [A Coup d’État in Kyiv],” Robitnycha Hazeta, 
May 3, 1918, 2; “Khrestnoiu puttiu [On the Way of the Cross],” Nova Rada, May 9, 1918, 1; “Komu shcho 
[Who Wants What],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 2, 1918, 1; “Sprava perevorotu na Ukraini v holovnii 
Komisii Nimetskoho Raikhstahu [The Case of Ukraine’s Coup d’État is Supervised by the Chief 
Commission of the German Reichstag],” Robitnycha Hazeta, May 11, 1918, 2; A. Yarynovych, “Potreba 
rozvazhnosty [The Need for Sanity],” Robitnycha Hazeta, May 16, 1918, 1.
67 “Delehatsiia sotsialistiv-federalistiv u nimetskoho posla Muma [The Delegation of Socialists-
Federalists at the Reception of the German Ambassador Mumm],” Nova Rada, May 19, 1918, 1; “Lyst 
Symona Petliury do posliv Nimechchyny ta Avstrii [The Letter of Symon Petliura to the Ambassadors 
of Germany and Austria],” Nova Rada, May 30, 1918, 2.
68 “Bilshovytskyi desant [The Bolshevik Landing],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 18, 1918, 2; “Nimtsi 
i bilshovyky [The Germans and the Bolsheviks],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 26, 1918, 2.
69 “Peremoha na Zakhodi [The Victory in the West],” Nova Rada, June 5, 1918, 2.
70 “Odhuky z Yevropy [The European Responses],” Nova rada, May 10, 1918, 1; “Ukraina v debatakh 
Raikhstahu [Ukraine in the Polemics of the Reichstag],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 28, 1918, 1.
71 “Ukrainska sprava v Nimechchyni i Avstrii [The Ukrainian Affairs in Germany and Austria],” Nova 
Rada, May 11, 1918, 1; “Vorwarts pro perevorot na Ukraini [Vorwarts About the Coup in Ukraine],” 
Robitnycha Hazeta, May 16, 1918, 2.
72 “Kudoiu ity [Where to Go]?,” Nova Rada, August 17, 1918, 1.
73 Nikovskyi, “Pered zminoiu oriientatsii,” 1; “Vesela stolytsia [The Joyful Capital],” Nova Rada, August 2, 
1918, 3.
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contrary, the Russian-language press of Kyiv welcomed the Hetman’s coup d’état as the precursor 
of Russia’s revival. Golos Kieva was delighted with the German deposition of the Ukrainian 
Government.74 It anticipated the closure of the “nonviable” Ukrainian project and the subsequent 
“monarchial German” return to “traditional friendship with Petrograd.” 75 The initial success of 
the German 1918 spring offensive on the Western front also prompted the emergence of the 
Russian Realpolitik based on “German orientation.” 76 Lastly, the media valued the German army’s 
protection against the Bolshevik threat.77
Each of the national groups considered the victorious German state as an example to 
follow. Nova Rada advocated for the European civilizational choice as an alternative to forced 
Russification,
іnstead of untidy impotent Moscow we want our external culture to match 
with the German, Romanic, and Anglo-Saxon cultures, we have had enough 
of the littered hut filled with fleas, we are longing for the space, air, light, 
and the conveniences of the white race… 78
Its motto was: “Enough with Moscow originality, long live the European stencil! But 
European! It is better to endure the European torturer rather than to live under Moscow granted 
freedom…” 79 In particular, Germany appeared to be the most comprehensible example of 
a “civilized country,” whose values of social justice and the high standard of life the Ukrainians 
were striving to adopt.80 In order to achieve this goal Nova Rada urged the public to cultivate the 
German-like spirit of “disciplined and systematic patriotism.” 81 Likewise, the Russian Kievskaia 
Mysl referred to the triumphant Germans as “teachers.” By learning from the best, Yulii Aikhenvald 
74 Iv. Shlykov, “Novaia vlast [The New Authorities],” Golos Kieva, May 3, 1918, 1; K. Pavlov, “Poslednii den 
Rady [The Last Day of the Rada],” Golos Kieva, 3 May, 1918, 1.
75 “Iz Moskvy v Kiev (prodolzhenie) [From Moscow to Kyiv: A Sequel],” Golos Kieva, May 3, 1918, 2.
76 “Germanskaia orientatsiia [The German Orientation],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 9, 1918, 1; B.T., “Novyi 
proryv frantsuzskogo fronta [The New Breakthrough of the French Front],” Golos Kieva, May 30, 1918, 
1; B.T., “Novaia bitva na Marne [The New Battle of the Marne],” Golos Kieva, June 1, 1918, 1.
77 Al. B-skii, “Agoniia bolshevizma v donetskom basseine [The Agony of Bolshevism in the Donetsk 
Basin],” Golos Kieva, May 17, 1918, 2; “Istreblenie bolshevistskogo otriada pod Taganrogom [The 
Annihilation of the Bolshevik Brigade near Taganrog],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 16, 1918, 3.
78 Prychepa, “Demarkatsiina liniia [The Demarcational Line],” Nova Rada, January 16, 1918, 1.
79 “Hodi balakaty [Enough with Talking]!,” Nova Rada, May 15, 1918, 1.
80 S. Dr., “Postachannia moloka po mistakh Nimechchyny [The Milk Supply in the Cities of Germany],” 
Robitnycha Hazeta, April 10, 1918, 2; “Shcho musyt znaty kozhen robitnyk pro sviato 1 maia [What 
Should Each Worker Know About the 1st May Holiday]?,” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 27, 1918, 2; “Z 
istorii sotsializmu [From the History of Socialism],” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 27, 1918, 2.
81 D. Kolonius, “Zavdannia nashoi shkilnoi orhanizatsii [The Goal of our School System],” Nova Rada, 
June 21, 1918, 2; Rusova, “Patriotyzm u vykhovanni [Patriotism in Education],” Nova Rada, July 25, 1918, 
3; V. Ivanenko, “V politychnomu khaosi [In the Political Chaos],” Nova Rada, August 14, 1918, 2.
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envisioned the possibility to outbid them in the near future —  “the same way the Prussians had 
once overcome Napoleonic France.” 82
While the fact of the German occupation was officially negated, the daily news presented 
the opposite.83 The media discussed the “German order” —  the consecutive measures of the 
German military administration, adopted to substitute the Hetman’s authority and enforce the 
region’s stability. For example, the German commandant’s office in Kyiv introduced rules on 
automobile traffic, certified gun owners, and prohibited any unauthorized public meetings.84 The 
Germans also managed to normalize the bread market of Kyiv through control over bakeries.85 
On the regional level they endeavored to restore the production capacity of enterprises —  either 
by salary motivation or by the threat of force.86 The press covered the German court-martial 
demonstration trials concerning the issues of larceny, felony, and sabotage.87
By October of 1918 the Ukrainian media were still confident of Germany’s invincibility.88 
They perceived Berlin’s peace offer as a goodwill gesture, designed to stop the bloodshed of the 
protracted conflict.89 As a result, the press managed to correctly assess the state of affairs only 
shortly before the Armistice.90 Its views of the November Revolution were ambivalent: while 
greeting the triumph of German Democracy, Nova Rada also empathized Germany’s “tragic end 
of the war.” 91 In particular, the Ukrainian right-wing politician Dmytro Dontsov condemned the 
Entente for the mistreatment of the defeated party. He predicted Germany’s resurrection:
82 “Yu.I. Aikhenvald,” Kievskaia Mysl, May 5, 1918, 4.
83 “Zaiavlenie gen. Kosha [General Kosch’s Statement],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 20, 1918, 2.
84 “Obiavlenie [The Announcement],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 9, 1918, 1; “Obiavlenie germanskoi 
komendatury (g. Kieva) [The Announcement of the German Commandant’s Office, Kyiv],” Kievskaia 
Mysl, June 11, 1918, 1; “1-e Maia [The 1st of May],” Poslednie Novosti, April 29,1918, 1.
85 “Prodovolstvennyi vopros [The Question of Provision],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 28, 1918, 1.
86 “Na sudostroitelnykh zavodakh [At the Shipyards],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 11, 1918, 3; “Polozhenie 
v Nikolaeve [The Situation in Mykolaiv],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 12, 1918, 3; “V Kerchi [In Kerch],” 
Kievskaia Mysl, May 31, 1918, 3; “Ochishchenie Kryma [The Clean-up of the Crimea],” Kievskaia Mysl, 
May 17, 1918, 1.
87 “Obiavleniia germanskogo komendanta [The Announcements of the German Commandant],” 
Kievskaia Mysl, June 15, 1918, 1; “Kazni [The Executions],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 7, 1918, 2; “Iz 
germanskikh ofitsialnykh istochnikov [From German Official Sources],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 5, 1918, 1.
88 “Stanovyshche Nimechchyny [The Condition of Germany],” Nova Rada, October 11, 1918, 1; 
“Propozytsii myru [The Peace Proposal],” Nova Rada, October 8, 1918, 1.
89 S. Yefremov, “Vo imia liudskosty [In the Name of Humanity],” Nova Rada, October 9, 1918, 1; 
P. Didushok, “V spravi myru [In the Matter of Peace],” Nova Rada, October 19, 1918, 2.
90 D. Dontsov, “Pered katastrofoiu [On the Brink of Calamity],” Nova Rada, October 19, 1918, 1; 
P. Didushok, “Mozhlyvist konfliktu [The Possibility of Conflict],” Nova Rada, October 31, 1918, 2.
91 Ch.K., “Po Yevropi (Dorozhni vrazhinnia) [In Europe: Travel Impressions],” Nova Rada, December 27, 
1918, 1–2; “Novi liude na obrii nimetskoho politychnoho zhyttia,” [The New People on the Horizon of 
the German Political Medium],” Nova Rada, November 12, 1918, 1.
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The Kaiser is only a temporary, though typical emanation of the German 
spirit. Deprived of one’s head, Prussian “militarism,” which has displayed 
such great moral strength and organizational ability in this war, —  would 
not perish and certainly Germany would not revert to the times of Goethe 
and Schiller, to the times of its political lethargy… 92
Concerning Ukrainian affairs, Nova Rada retrospectively blamed the German Junkers 
and the generals for their cooperation with the Russian “enemies of Ukrainian statehood.” 93 
Nevertheless, the newspaper hoped for the preservation of a strong democratic German state 
as a strategic ally of Ukraine.94
The Russian-language press of Kyiv celebrated the forthcoming victory of the Allied Powers, 
interpreting it as the end of the German “Brest yoke” period of Russian history.95 Golos Kieva 
rejoiced over the failure of Germany’s “World Hegemony” and expected the near death of the 
“favorite child of the German imperialism —  Ukrainian independence.” 96 Professor Aleksandr 
Pogodin wrote:
Our fathers had outlived the foundation of the German Empire, we observe 
its downfall. … The New Grunwald [allusion to the battle of Grunwald] 
is destroying all those ephemeral state entities, which were created on 
the basis of the presently annulled Brest treaty. Admittedly, the Germans 
themselves were at a loss at what to do with these “states,” so that emerging 
Lithuania, the Baltic and Finnish states, not to mention Ukraine, disturbed 
them significantly. Their restitution to the bosom of a single Russia is 
indispensable… 97
92 Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) was a Ukrainian politician, journalist, and ideologist of Ukrainian 
nationalism. In August of 1914 he became the first chairman of the Union for the liberation of 
Ukraine, and headed the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin in 1914–1916. From May 1918 Dontsov 
held the post of Director of the Ukrainian News Agency in the Government of Hetman Pavlo 
Skoropadskyi. I. V. Verba, Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], vol. 2, 
s. v. “Dontsov Dmytro Ivanovych,” (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2004), 452. Source: Dm. Dontsov, “Kaizer 
[Kaiser],” Nova Rada, November 12, 1918, 2.
93 M. Kushnir, “Hetmanshchyna na Ukraini [Hetman Rule in Ukraine],” Nova Rada, December 18, 1918, 1.
94 Romul, “Na rozputti [At the Crossroads],” Nova Rada, December 1, 1918, 2; Ch.K., “Po Yevropi,” 1–2.
95 “Kiev, 7 oktiabria 1918 g. [Kyiv, October 7, 1918],” Golos Kieva, October 8, 1918, 1; “Kiev, 23 noiabria [Kyiv, 
November 23],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 23, 1918, 1.
96 Skif, “Kompromiss [The Compromise],” Golos Kieva, October 8, 1918, 1; Al. Pilenko, “Tochki zreniia 
[Points of View],” Golos Kieva, November 16, 1918, 2; Evgenii Efimovskii, “Kiev, 14 noiabria 1918 g. 
[Kyiv, November 14, 1918],” Golos Kieva, November 15, 1918, 1; “Ukrainskoe dvizhenie [The Ukrainian 
Movement],” Golos Kieva, October 13, 1918, 4.
97 A. Pogodin, “Novyi Griunvald [The New Grunwald],” Golos Kieva, November 17, 1918, 1; Valerii Levitskii, 
“Delit li Rossiiu [Should Russia be Divided]?,” Golos Kieva, November 28, 1918, 1; S.L., “Triedinaia Rus 
[The Triune Rus],” Golos Kieva, November 20, 1918, 1.
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Similarly to Golos Kieva, the Russian liberal Kievskaia Mysl demonstrated an overt anti-
Ukrainian stance. It reflected upon Germany’s idle attempt to partition the Russian state with 
the “artificial concept of Ukraine.” 98 After the collapse of the Ukrainian Hetmanate in December 
of 1918, Kievskaia Mysl tagged it as a “German-Viennese operetta” with former Hetman Pavlo 
Skoropadskyi being “a shiny toy” for the German generals.99 At the same time, comforted by a 
sense of Russia’s involvement in the common Allied triumph, Golos Kieva sought for reconciliation 
with the Germans. Aleksandr Otsup believed that “the people from the Spree, the Elbe, and 
the Rhine, organized, methodical, slow-witted,” should take their rightful place in the family of 
Europe.100 Likewise, Kievskaia Mysl sympathized with the German Revolution and disapproved of 
the Entente’s harsh measures towards the defeated.101 It foresaw the future revival of a humiliated 
Germany “in an atmosphere, poisoned by hatred, lust for revenge, and national chauvinism.” 102
Reaching its peak at the end of 1918, the Kyiv press’s interest in Germany had gradually 
declined in the following months of national turmoil. In 1919 the Germans no longer played a 
crucial role in the political destiny of Ukraine. Demoralized by their own revolution and the 
war defeat, German troops abandoned the country by March of 1919. Taking advantage of their 
withdrawal, the Russian Bolsheviks had launched a second military intervention in Ukraine 
already in November of 1918. Since then the Soviet–Ukrainian war became a primary object of 
media attention.
Conclusion
Within a year of the 1917 foundation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic the image of the 
Germans in the press of Kyiv had undergone a number of drastic changes. Different for the local 
Ukrainian and Russian-language media, these changes mirrored the two national paradigms. 
Specifically, it was the idea of national self-determination that had conditioned the Ukrainian 
newspapers’ attitude towards the Germans. Reluctant to support Russia’s war ambitions, the 
media had replaced propaganda of the “German foe” with the rhetoric of peace. The subsequent 
Ukrainian turnabout regarding the image of the “German ally” was triggered by the December 
1917 Soviet Russian aggression against the UNR. Since then, the Bolshevik and, more generally, the 
Russian peril had predetermined the image of Germany as the lesser of two evils. Geopolitically, 
Nova Rada relied on Berlin’s support for Ukraine as a part of the “Russian colossus” restraining 
strategy. Neither the “outrageous” German interference into the country’s domestic affairs nor 
the 1918 Deutsches Kaiserreich defeat had effectively altered this conviction. As for the Russian-
language press of Kyiv, its anti-German sentiment stemmed from all-Russian patriotism. In 
98 “Hetmanshchina [The Hetmanate],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 15, 1918, 1; “Po Germanii. Doktor Paul 
Rorbakh [In Germany, Dr. Paul Rohrbach],” Kievskaia Mysl, October 25, 1918, 1.
99 “Hetmanshchina,” 1.
100 A. A. Otsup, “Nedavnee [Recent Developments],” Golos Kieva, November 21, 1918, 3.
101  “Vozzvanie soveta deputatov [The Appeal of the Board of Deputies],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 
17, 1918, 1; “Imperatorskaia semia [The Emperor’s Family],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 20, 1918, 
3; “V Germanii [In Germany],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 23, 1918, 2.
102 “Burg-friden [Burgfrieden],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 12, 1918, 1.
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the fall of 1917, the media continued to perceive Germany as the principal enemy, allegedly 
responsible for Russia’s disintegration. In particular, they apprehended both the Bolshevik and 
the Ukrainian regimes as the products of the cunning Berlin policy of divide et impera. While 
silent or hypocritically respectful during the period of the “German military occupation,” the 
Russian newspapers had returned to their usual anti-German utterances on the eve of the Central 
Powers’ collapse in October of 1918.
Despite the controversy over Germany’s political role, both the Ukrainian and the Russian-
language press of Kyiv shared a common view on the merits of Kultur Deutschlands. Throughout 
1918 the media had praised the stereotypical German virtues of strong patriotism, order and 
discipline, integrity and diligence. They urged their audience to follow the German example of 
success and prosperity. Unanimously, the newspapers associated Germany with being a part of 
a better, “civilized” Europe to the west of the former Romanov Empire. Further studies should 
examine to what extent this positive image resembles the basic pre-war stereotypes about the 
Germans in the 1914 Kyiv press.
In general, the article has established a Ukrainian perspective on the image of the Germans 
in the First World War. The dispute between the Ukrainian and the Russian-language press of Kyiv 
over the issue of Germany should be seen as a reflection of the developments of the 1917–1918 
Ukrainian Revolution.
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